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In this paper, problems connected to the adaptation of EU cereal intervention in Hungary 
are discussed. Statistical evidence is provided about the two record years of intervention in 
Hungary proving that farmers did not take part in intervention though the system was 
sought to be tailored to farmers’ needs. Intervention purchases took place at the wholesale 
level  and  traders  were  the  most  active  participants  in  both  intervention  periods.  This 
dynamic intervention activity of traders will significantly alter the Hungarian trade sector 
by  bringing  it  closer  to  the  physical  processes  of  the  cereal  chain.  As  to  the  size  of 
intervention, the great volume of the purchase of maize has resulted in an exceptionally 
severe  problem  considering  the  large  surplus  of  Hungarian  cereals.  Recently,  the 
Commission hampered maize intervention in Hungary by excluding this crop from cereals 
eligible for intervention. This measure is criticised in the paper, as we deem it unnecessary 
in recent market conditions, and in our view it doesn’t make up the compulsory need for a 
complex reconsideration of recent EU cereal policy on the long term. 
Keywords: EU cereal policy, cereal intervention, maize intervention, Hungary. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Cereal intervention as a market measure was already known in the Hungarian cereal sector 
prior to accession. However, this market scheme had not been used before accession. Prior 
to Hungary’s accession to the EU, ad hoc policy measures were applied on the country’s 
cereal market (mainly with the aim of damping the defeating effects of the very frequent 
oversupply on the domestic market) instead of the EU conform market intervention.  
Therefore, the adaptation of EU cereal intervention on the cereal market in Hungary was a 
new task for both, for the agricultural administration and, for the market participants, as 
well.  This  task  involved  two  types  of  duties.  First  a  rather  general  undertaking,  the 
establishment of a paying agency certified by the EU (implementing cereal intervention - 
among many CAP schemes) and secondly, the national adaptation of basic EU cereal 
CMO regulations (No. 1784/2003/93/EC and No. 824/2000/EC). This paper discusses the 
latter, only the adaptation process and than checks the effectiveness of the system on the 
two record large Hungarian cereal intervention in the seasons 2004/05 and 2005/06. (The 
process of setting up the Hungarian paying agency is analysed in another study (RIEGER – 
TÖRÖK, 2000).
 1 
2  ADAPTATION OF CAP CEREAL INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY 
This  adaptation  incorporated  three  important  decisions  for  Hungarian  authorities:  (a) 
resolving  the  minimum  quantity  eligible  for  intervention;  (b)  designation  of  the 
                                           
1  For  this  paper  it  is  important  that  according  to  relevant  EU  regulations  cereal  intervention  can  be 
implemented only by an accredited paying agency. In recent EU practice there can be more than one 
paying agency in a member state, but Hungary decided for one paying agency which implements all 
CAP  measures,  include  intervention.  This  institution  is  the  Agricultural  and  Rural  Development 
Agency  (ARDA).  Hereinafter  when  we  use  in  the  text  phrases  “intervention  agency”,  “cereal 
intervention agency” or “paying agency”, is all cases we refer to ARDA. intervention centres; and finally, (c) the determination of minimum requirements for cereal 
warehouses storing intervention stocks. 
a.)  Resolution  of  the  minimum  quantity  for  intervention.  According  to  the  pertaining 
regulations: “any holder of a homogeneous batch of not less than 80 tons of common 
wheat, barley, maize …. harvested within the Community, shall be entitled to offer the 
batch to the intervention agency” (No. 824/2000/EC, article 1). Consequently, the member 
state  may  apply  a  higher  quantity  for  minimum,  as  many  countries  –  based  on  the 
characteristics of their cereal sector – in effect do.  
Hungarian decision makers aimed to guarantee a relatively good access to intervention for 
Hungarian market participants. Therefore, the lowest allowable batch – 80 tons – was 
established as the minimum. Basic consideration behind this decision was that the 80 tons 
minimum would favour direct participation of farmers (cereal producers), and in this case 
the price defending effect of intervention wouldn’t appear at the wholesale price level but 
instead, directly at the producers’ price level.
2 On the other side, decision makers having 
chosen the minimum set in the Regulation were aware of the fact that as a consequence of 
this  decision  producers  would  gain  on  the  costs  of  the  state  budget  because  the  low 
minimum  increases  the  number  of  intervention  offers  and  makes  intervention  more 
expensive for the member state.  
b.)  Designation  of  the  intervention  centres.  Alike  the  determination  of  intervention 
minimum,  the  designation  of  intervention  centres  basically  influences  the  intervention 
process. Intervention centres as a matter of fact are reference points for the calculation of 
delivery  costs.  Concerning  delivery  costs,  relevant  EU  regulation  enacts  as  follows: 
“Transport costs from the place where the goods are stored when the offer is made to the 
intervention centre to which they can be transported at least expense shall be borne by the 
offerer” (Article 2, Points 2, Paragraph 2, EEC. Reg. No. 824/2000).  
The  above  regulation  also  incorporates  a  method  for  the  calculation  of  delivery  costs 
which the offerer of the cereal batch has to pay. Accordingly, the offerer should pay in all 
cases  for  the  distance  between  his  or  her  storehouse  and  the  nearest  designated 
intervention  centre,  without  reference  to  which  intervention  storehouse  the  cereal  is 
delivered. In cases when this effective delivery distance is shorter than the above distance 
the delivery cost-difference will be deducted from the paid intervention price. In contrast, 
when this distance is longer the cost surplus connected to the delivery of offered cereal 
will be added to the paid intervention price.
3  
Consequently,  the  actual  intervention  price  paid  to  offerers  will  be  influenced  by  the 
average delivery distance of cereal lots, as the average distance will be determined by the 
number and geographical distribution of intervention centres in the member state.
4   
Since  the  balance  of  delivery  costs  connected  to  the  intervention  purchase  of  cereals 
should  be  financed  from  the  Community  budget,  the  minimum  requirements  for  the 
designation of intervention centres are resolved in the pertaining Community regulations. 
                                           
2 Calculating with an average yield of 5 tons for cereals the eligible 80 tons quantity can be produced on 
an area not more than 16 hectares (or 39,54 acres) which size, taking into account sizes of Hungarian 
cereal producing farms, would make a direct sell for intervention possible for many farmers. 
3 The purpose of this rule is to secure unchanged delivery conditions for cereal offerers, independent from 
the storehouse supply (capacity) of the national paying agency. 
4 For  Hungary in our estimation ±10 kilometres (6,21 miles) difference in average delivery distance 
evokes ±0,5 percent price deviation in paid intervention price. These  reference  points  should  be  located  in  regions  with  a  significant  oversupply  of 
cereals and abundant number of cereal warehouses. Reference point should also  have 
“special importance as a market inside and outside the Community” (EEC. Reg. 2273/93, 
article 1). In a geographical region fulfilling the said requirements, warehouses can be 
designated to intervention centres provided that this particular warehouse is technically 
well equipped (permitting the taking over, handling and discharge of a sufficiently large 
quantity of cereals) and has favourable transport connections to the taking over – and, 
which is more important – to discharge of cereals (article 2, EEC. Reg. No. 2273/93). 
Hungary’s proposal for the designation of her cereal intervention centres submitted to the 
Commission was prepared on the grounds of a paper based on very detailed Hungarian 
cereal statistics (AKII 2002). The priority of the Hungarian nomination was taking into 
account the connection between nominated intervention centres on one side and cost of 
intervention on the other side to set up a cheap intervention system. Therefore Hungary 
aimed to have accepted by the Commission as many intervention centres as she could. The 
Commission accepted all of the 75 Hungarian proposals and published them in the OJ on 
19
th October 2004. (see Annex 1: “The geographical distribution of the 75 Hungarian 
intervention centres” )
5.  
c.) Requirements for intervention storehouses. Warehouses in intervention centres are not 
automatically intervention storehouses, only if the owner is ready to rent storage to the 
intervention agency, and the intervention agency – taking into account the cereal market 
situation – considers, that it is necessary to hire warehouse capacity in the specific region. 
Otherwise the EU doesn’t determine any specific requirements for storehouse capacities in 
which  intervention  stocks  can  be  stored.  Decisions  concerning  this  issue  fall  within 
national jurisdiction. However, there are two general principles which indirectly regulating 
the requirements for intervention storehouses. The first principle is that the quantity and 
quality  of  intervention  stocks  can  not  be  endangered  during  the  storage  period  by 
insufficient storage conditions. The second principle resulting from the first issue is that: 
the member state bears full and indirect financial responsibility for the preservation of 
intervention  stocks.  (Practically,  the  EU  settles  such  losses  not  against  individual 
storekeepers  in  the  member  state,  but  the  member  state  pays  for  losses  and  then  the 
member state has to clear these debts with storage keepers.) 
As a result, the member state has three different priorities at hiring intervention capacities. 
First of all,  the  risk  of preserving intervention  stocks has to  be  minimized. Secondly, 
sufficient capacity should be available for the intervention buying in during the specific 
intervention period. The third considerable issue is the price of the hired capacity, given 
that if the member state pays higher price than the EU reimbursement unit for warehouse, 
the  difference  should  be  borne  by  the  member  state’s  budget.  Among  the  three 
aforementioned issues, decisions makers in Hungary have given absolute priority to the 
first  one,  and  even  to  the  first  one  (risk  minimizing)  very  one-sided,  so  that  they 
minimized (only) technical requirements for hired intervention capacities. This concept –  
given  the  record number  of  intervention  offers –  has  resulted  in  a  severe  shortage of 
intervention  capacity,  which  practically  blocked  the start of intervention buying-in  for 
                                           
5In our calculations in Hungary less than 40 thousands hectares cereal area belongs to one intervention 
centre, and the average paid distance of offers was less than 20 kilometres from which means that in 
the two intervention periods the cereal offerers had to pay in average approximately 300 HUF/ton 
(1,2€/t) delivery cost, which sum is about 1,2% of the intervention price. several months and endangered the successful implementation of intervention in the first 
intervention period. In the subsequent months, under an increasing political pressure by 
various farmers’ organisations (!) the government was forced to reduce requirements for 
storehouses in many stages to near storage supply to the capacity demand of intervention 
buying in.  
 
3  MAIN FIGURES OF THE TWO RECORD YEARS OF CEREAL INTERVENTION IN  
HUNGARY, IN 2004/05 AND 2005/06 
It  was  well  known  before  starting  the  intervention  that  Hungary  is  a  country  with 
significant oversupply on the cereal market as compared to the domestic demand. As a 
consequence  of  this  unbalanced  domestic  cereal  market,  Hungary  became  a  very  big 
player especially with the dramatic decrease of her husbandry production in the European 
cereal market in the nineties. In this pre-accession period, main destinations for Hungarian 
cereal exports were first of all the Balkans’ region, Poland and Northern African countries, 
the low price regions of the European cereal market. 
Under  such  circumstances,  it  was  not  surprising  that  after  the  accession  intervention 
substituted low-priced exports in the Hungarian cereal sector.
6 That stands behind the first 
two period size buying up – in the intervention periods 2004/05 and 2005/06 – when there 
was  exceptionally  good  cereal  harvest  in  the  country.  During  these  two  intervention 
periods, Hungary bought in more than 8 million tons of cereals for intervention, and at that 
time – in the Spring 2006 – it seemed that this trend would continue for many years. But 
due to various factors, conditions in the world cereal market dramatically changed during 
the  harvest  of  the  2006  year’s  cereal  production  when  prices  went  up  so  high  that 
intervention buying-up neared to zero even in the “land-locked” Hungarian cereal market.
7 
In the first intervention period 2004/05 buying-up was considerably delayed in Hungary. 
There was an acute risk that the Hungarian intervention agency would not be able to buy 
up all valid offers only by the end of August with effective support from the Commission. 
To  avoid  this  failure,  the  Commission  extended  the  deadline  for  the  delivery  of 
intervention offers to intervention warehouses from 31
st July to 31
st August for the ten new 
member countries, and prolonged the length of the submission of valid intervention offers 
from four to seven months in the intervention period 2004/05. It was also part of the 
relevant  Community  regulation  that  the  commission  reimbursed  extra  storage  costs  of 
intervention  offers  from  the  EU  budget.  The  offerers  got  the  monthly  EU  storage 
reimbursement from the EU budget, if the length of the offer exceeded four months (EEC 
Reg. No. 49/2005.).  
Apart from the above support form the EU, the Hungarian paying agency enlarged its 
capacity by other measures as well to be able to buy up all valid intervention offers. In 
                                           
6 The size of the Hungarian cereal export prior to accession was, depending on weather conditions, from 1 
up to 3 million tons, yearly.  
7 These very hectically movements in the Hungarian cereal market caused economic and political tensions 
in both relations, within Hungary and between the Commission and Hungary as well. The conflict 
within the country was between participants on one side and the Hungarian paying agency on the other 
side. Businesses blamed the Hungarian authorities that it misled the market. It evoked a boom in the 
Hungarian  storage  sector  which  turned  out  to  be  sufficient  in  the  altered  market  conditions. 
Concerning the Commission – member state relations this tension came to light in the dispute about 
the future (abolishment) of maize intervention. addition to the aforementioned reduction of requirements for storage capacities and the 
support from the EU the paying agency enlarged its control capacity at buying up by 
involving the control capacity of the public warehouses into the intervention’ buying-in 
process. The take-over of offers was significantly speeded up by the fact that the agency 
introduced take-over “on-the-spot”: if the warehouse of the offerer fulfilled the minimum 
requirements than the agency bought up the cereal and hired the storage capacity at the 
same time. In this manner, the batch of cereals was stored in the same storage space 
without moving the crop. Due to these measures, the intervention agency was able to buy 
up all valid offers in the first intervention period, which had been closed with a record 
quantity of 3.89 million tons, out of which 2.25 million tons were maize and 1.53 million 
tons were wheat. – Barley intervention is not significant in Hungary compared to other 
European member states, it was not more than 0.11 million tons in the intervention period 
2004/05.  
In  the  second  intervention  period  2005/06,  implementation  of  the  record  intervention 
buying in caused less problems as compared to the previous year. In 2005/2006, Hungary 
bought in 4,22 million tons, of which the quantity of wheat was less than in the previous 
year (“only” 0,93 million tons), and the quantity of maize was 3,2 million tons. The large 
volume of maize bought in shocked not only the Hungarian authorities, but even more the 
Commission.  Development  of  the  system  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  2005/06  the 
percentage of “on the spot buying-up” decreased from 88% in the previous period to 73%.  
In the third intervention period, by the time when Hungary had acquired all conditions 
(including well equipped storage capacities), market conditions changed in whole Europe 
(including Hungary), and cereal intervention buying up was less than 10 thousands tons in 
EU-27. (In Hungary 1,5 thousand tons of maize were bought up during this period. – (see  
Annex 2. - Detailed figures for all there intervention periods) 
 
3.1  The two record years of cereal intervention in Hungary in comparison to the 
EU, and the consequences thereof 
Hungary implemented the ever-largest intervention in the history of CAP in intervention 
periods 2004/05 and 2005/06. In average, Hungarian authorities had to buy-in 26,2% (!) of 
the  production  of  the  main  intervention  crops  during  the  two  intervention  periods, 
compared to the average ratio of 2,7% in the other member states.  
Table 1: Hungarian cereal intervention in comparison to the EU 
(EU-25=100) 
  Wheat  Maize  Barley  Total 
Intervention period 2004/05 
Cereal production in 2004  5,0%  18,7%  2,3%  7,0% 
Intervention buying in  22,7%  93,0%  5,5%  34,9% 
Intervention period 2005/06 
Cereal production in 2005  4,6%  23,1%  2,3%  7,6% 
Intervention buying in  33,7%  84,9%  4,6%  49,3% 
Average for the two periods 
Cereal production in 2005  4,8%  20,8%  2,3%  7,3% 
Intervention buying in  25,9%  88,1%  5,0%  41,2% 
Source: Annex 2           
In an other comparison, the Hungarian production of the selected main intervention crops 
totalled up to only 7,3 percent of the production of the EU-25, whereas the same ratio for 
intervention buying up is 41,2%. Concerning Hungarian intervention, not only the size of 
intervention  but  its  crop-structure  was  even  a  bigger  problem  for  the  Commission. 
Namely, Hungary bought-in 31,3% of her maize production for intervention in the average 
of the two intervention periods 2004/05 and 2005/06 as compared to 0,9% in the EU-24. 
As a consequence, the ratio of the buying-up of maize in Hungary amounted to 88,1% of 
the total quantity of the enlarged EU.  
This was the first time in the history of the EU, when she had to confront with significant 
maize  intervention  stocks.  The  “maize  problem”  seemed  to  be  insolvable  for  the 
Commission before the harvest of 2006. Prior to Hungary’s accession, the EU was a net 
importer of maize, and her cereal policy suited to this condition. Therefore, at that time it 
appeared that the EU cereal policy had to be changed to enable the EU to handle the huge 
Hungarian maize surplus. Instead of changing the cereal policy, a more effortless way was 
chosen by the EU, namely, a regulation limiting maize intervention for two years and 
eliminating it up to the third year was issued (Council Reg. 735/2007).
8 
Another important consequence of the first two record years of Hungarian intervention 
buying in was that it revealed for European decision makers that the production capacity 
(oversupply) of the Hungarian cereal sector had been underestimated to a great extent 
prior to the accession. These problems connected to the size and crop-structure of the 
Hungarian cereal intervention stocks will force the Commission to reconsider recent CAP 
cereal policy on the long term, and these reconsiderations should cover a much  more 
comprehensive issue than that of the problem of maize, or even the cereal policy.
9  
3.2  The participation of cereal farmers in the intervention system “tailored to 
farmers’ needs” 
As  stated  above,  during  the  adaptation  of  the  EU  cereal  intervention  in  Hungary  the 
priorities were to create a system which makes it possible for farmers to participate in 
intervention directly (80 tons minimum  eligible quantity), and to establish a relatively 
cheap intervention system (applying a dense network of intervention centres).  
Hereinafter, we will analyse the data of intervention purchases to get a realistic idea of its 
features.  
For this purpose we classified offerers into three categories. The first category involves 
offerers submitting less than one thousand tons for intervention (these are – most probably 
– farmers). In the next category, there are businesses which sold a volume between one 
thousand and ten thousand tons for intervention (these businesses may be both farmers and 
traders).  Finally,  in  the  third  group  involves  offerers  having  sold  a  volume  over  ten 
thousand tons for intervention (these are – most probably – traders). 
                                           
8 It demonstrates only the lowliness of the decision-making because by the time when this regulation had 
been published (11
th of June, 2007) the world and European cereal market with big price increase 
superseded EU intervention up to the due CAP supervision, the “health check”.  
9 This big Hungarian overproduction in the cereal sector first reveals the recent low integration level of 
the  enlarged  “single  market”  and  secondly,  if  the  CAP  in  the  future  would  like  to  preserve  any 
efficiency character, then on the long term it should force a geographical redistribution of the whole 
European agricultural production on the basis of effective use of capacities.  During the intervention period 2004/05, a total quantity of 3 896,8 thousand tons of cereals 
were bought up by the Hungarian intervention Agency. This quantity was offered by 983 
market participants, and the size of the average offer was 4 thousand tons. These are the 
most general figures for this intervention period. 
Analysing intervention by the different categories, in 2004/05 there were 504 offerers 
(51,3%) who sold less than 1000 tons for intervention. The total quantity of offers in this 
category was 112 thousands tons. This quantity is 2,9 percent of the total intervention in 
that period and 0,7 percent of the yearly production.  
The number of offerers in the next category – between one thousand and 10 thousand tons 
– is 411 (41,8%). These businesses sold 1,4 million tons of cereals for intervention (35,8 
percent of the total purchase in 2004/05 and 8,9 percent of the year’s production.  
Table 2: Main categories of offerers participating in cereal intervention in Hungary during 
the intervention period 2004/05 
Categories*  Offerers  Total quantity offered 
Tons  Number  Total=100  Thousand tons  Total=100 
Oq< 1 000  504  51,3  112,0  2,9 
1 000<Oq< 10 000  411  41,8  1 400,0  35,9 
10 000<Oq  68  6,9  2 383,8  61,2 
Total  983  100,0  3 895,8  100,0 
*Oq = quantity offered 
Source: Own calculations. 
Finally in the last category of sales over 10 thousand tons per offerer, the relevant number 
was 68 (6,9%). These offerers – most probably traders –sold 2,4 million tons (61,3%) of 
cereals for intervention which was quantity 13,2% of the annual production.  
Evaluating the volume of intervention sales in 2004/05, we can conclude that wholesalers’ 
participation was dominant whereas direct involvement of farmers was insignificant in the 
Hungarian cereal intervention in 2004/05. Concerning the number of farmers taking part in 
intervention was relatively high (over 50%) in 2004/05, although, in comparison with the 
number of producers who took part in the area based direct payments scheme in 2004 
there is a different scenario. In this context, the ratio was much lower: only 0,5 %. We can 
arrive at the conclusion that only 0.5% of the cereal farmers could enjoy a direct price 
protection effect of cereal intervention in the marketing season 2004/05 in Hungary. In 
Annex 5, it is revealed in a more detailed categorisation of intervention sales that if the 
eligible minimum had been 100 tons instead of 80, only 127 offerers (farmers) would have 
dropped out from intervention since the intervention period of 2004/05.  
The same data for the subsequent intervention periods are summarized in Table 3. In 
2005/06 the total Hungarian cereal intervention was 4 207,4 thousand tons, 8,3 percent 
more  than  in the previous  period,  but  even  with  a significant increase  of  intervention 
purchase, the number of businesses taking part in intervention decreased by  4,7 percent to 
937. From this comes that the average size of intervention purchase increased by 12,5 
percent from 4 thousands tons to 4,5 thousand tons in this intervention. Table 3: Main categories of offerers taking part in cereal intervention in Hungary in the 
intervention period 2005/06 
Categories  Offerers  Total quantity offered 
Tons  Number  Total=100  Thousand tons  Total=100 
Oq< 1 000  413  44,1  107,4  2,5 
1 000<Oq< 10 000  438  46,7  1 600,0  37,9 
10 000<Oq  86  9,2  2 510,6  59,5 
Total  937  100,0  4 218,0  100,0 
*Oq = quantity offered 
Source: Own calculations. 
When analysing figures in Table 3, it turns out that the importance of the category of 
offerers  with  sales  less  than  1000  tons  (farmers)  dropped  down  proportionally.  The 
number  of  sellers  in  this  category  decreased  by  18%,  while  the  quantity  they  sold 
decreased by 4 percent. (Even in the situation when the total quantity purchased increased 
by 8.3 percent!)  
Concerning  the  category  of  offerers  selling  quantities  between  one  thousand  and  10 
thousand tons, both the number of businesses and the volume they sold for intervention 
increased. The number of market participants in this group increased by 7 % in 2005/06 
and the volume they sold raised by 14 percent as compared to the previous intervention 
period.  
Finally, in view of the third category of offerers with intervention sales over 10 thousand 
tons (traders) the number of sellers remained unchanged as compared to the previous year, 
whereas the volume of sales by these participants increased by 5 % in 2005/06.  
 
4  CONCLUSIONS  
After  assessing  the  two  Hungarian  intervention  periods,  it  can  be  concluded  that  an 
intervention scheme “tailored to farmer’ needs” does not exist. Intervention took place in 
both periods at the level of wholesale traders, even though the sizes of cereal farms are 
relatively large in Hungary, and the possible lowest minimum for the quantity eligible for 
intervention was established. Based on the Hungarian experiences, the following statement 
can  be  made:  setting  a  too  low  minimum  quantity  eligible  for  intervention  does  not 
influence  significantly  either  the  volume  or  the  composition  of  market  participants  in 
intervention. 
We did not study the impact of intervention on producer prices in the Hungarian domestic 
market. Apart from this result, another important outcome of cereal intervention could be 
observed  in  the  two  records  year  in  Hungary.    Namely,  there  was  a  considerable 
development in traders’ post-harvest activities. As a result of participating in the process 
of intervention, traders – not having involved in the physical processes of the cereal chain 
before  –  have  built  new  storehouses  and  they  had  to  supervise  the  preservation  of 
intervention stocks.  
It is also very important to observe, that this large Hungarian surplus showed us how low 
the level of integration of the enlarged agricultural single market was, when the impact of 
measures aiming at price equalisation in the cereal market could not been discovered even 
though there was severe drought in the Iberian Peninsula.  As  to  the  dimensions  of  the  two  record  years  of  Hungarian  cereal  intervention,  the 
potential capacity of the Hungarian cereal sector was revealed.  During these periods, it 
turned out that the EU cereal policy is very sensitive to maize surplus because it was 
originally created for an import market of feed, and by the autumn of 2006 there was an 
acute danger that the Commission would not be able to handle Hungarian maize surplus 
with the available measures of the EU cereal policy. The restriction and after that the 
abolishment of EU maize intervention doesn’t seem to be a sufficient solution. Minor 
mistake in this decision is to take these unnecessary measures before due assessment in a 
situation when the European and world market prices of cereals, including maize are 20-
30% above the EU intervention price. The Authors consider that it caused unnecessary 
tensions in the relationship of a new member state (Hungary) and the Commission.  
We are afraid that a more severe mistake is that this measure distracts the attention from 
the  fact  that  the  Hungarian  maize-surplus  should  be  handled  as  an  indicator  of  the 
insufficient use of European agricultural capacity which makes it necessary to redistribute 
the European agricultural production.  
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Summarizing figures of the Hungarian cereal interventions, 2004/05, 2005/06 and 2006/07 
Storage capacity  G A B O N A  Storehouses 



































Restored  Planned  Finished  Fee of 
restoring 
Date 
1 000t.  1 000t.  1 000t.  mrd.  1 000t.  1 000t.  1 000t.  1 000t.  mrd Ft.  1 000t.  1 000t.  1 
000t.  1 000t.  mrd 
Ft.  1 000t.  1 000t.  1 
000t.  1 000t.  1 000t.  1 000t.  1 000t.  mrd Ft. 
2004-
2005  2 570,5  2 361,0  4 931,5  3,8  3 895,8  3 430,1  462,6  3 895,8  113,5  320,0  134,6  0,0  71,9  1,7  3 511,0     62,7  3 573,7  -  -  -  - 
2005-
2006  7 836,8  2 015,0  9 851,8  26,4  4 218,0  3 087,4  1 130,6  4 218,0  126,5  1 356,8  995,8  2,6  758,9  21,2  6 848,3     236,8  7 085,2  545,5  2 158,4  1 358,9  2,9 
2006-
2007  3 093,7  4 760,9  7 854,5  67,2  14,0  0,0  1,5  1,5  0,0  4 311,2  4 638,1  203,0  3 710,5  139,1  2 341,4  664,3  230,0  3 235,6  108,8  1 704,6  1 570,1  4,1 








The quantity of cereal intervention buying in Hungary and the remaining member state 
(EU-24) in the intervention period 2004/05 and 2005/06 
         Million tons
Denomination  Wheat Maize BarleyTotal 
Hungary 
Intervention period 2004/05 
Cereal production in 2004  5,95 8,33 1,41 15,70
Intervention buying in  1,53 2,25 0,11 3,89
Buying-in % of production  25,7%27,1% 7,7%24,8%
Intervention period 2005/06 
Cereal production in 2005  5,08 9,02 1,19 15,29
Intervention buying in  0,93 3,20 0,09 4,22
Buying-in % of production  18,3%35,5% 7,8%27,6%
Average for the two periods 
Cereal production in 2005  5,52 8,67 1,30 15,49
Intervention buying in  1,23 2,73 0,10 4,06
Buying-in % of production  22,0%31,3% 7,8%26,2%
EU-24 
Intervention period 2004/05 
Cereal production in 2004  118,50 44,60 60,40223,50
Intervention buying in  5,22 0,17 1,86 7,25
Buying-in % of production  4,4% 0,4% 3,1% 3,2%
Intervention period 2005/06 
Cereal production in 2004  109,70 39,00 51,60200,30
Intervention buying in  1,82 0,57 1,95 4,34
Buying-in % of production  1,7% 1,5% 3,8% 2,2%
Average for the two periods 
Cereal production in 2004  114,10 41,80 56,00211,90
Intervention buying in  3,52 0,37 1,90 5,80
Buying-in % of production  3,0% 0,9% 3,4% 2,7%
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Agricultural and Rural Development Office, 
Commission          ANNEX 4 
Geographical distribution ot the Hungarian cereal production (2004 and 2005) and cereal intervention (2004/05 and 2005/06)  
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Bács-Kiskun  1 366 881  205 151  15,0%  1 360 783  376 016  27,6%  2 727 664  581 167  21,3% 
Békés  1 645 076  477 590  29,0%  1 396 640  416 892  29,8%  3 041 716  894 482  29,4% 
Csongrád  936 968  181 960  19,4%  795 702  154 712  19,4%  1 732 670  336 672  19,4% 
Hajdú-Bihar  1 503 248  505 049  33,6%  1 247 604  446 458  35,8%  2 750 852  951 507  34,6% 
Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok  1 099 099  376 796  34,3%  911 213  370 033  40,6%  2 010 312  746 829  37,1% 
Dél-Alföld 
Összesen  6 551 272  1 746 546  26,7%  5 711 942  1 764 111  30,9%  12 263 214  3 510 657  28,6% 
Baranya  1 104 403  254 138  23,0%  1 082 980  288 502  26,6%  2 187 383  542 640  24,8% 
Somogy  1 157 124  266 170  23,0%  1 232 795  262 138  21,3%  2 389 919  528 308  22,1% 
Tolna  1 188 605  295 869  24,9%  1 310 273  357 047  27,2%  2 498 878  652 916  26,1% 
Zala  544 226  67 968  12,5%  510 985  44 254  8,7%  1 055 211  112 222  10,6% 
Dél-Dunántúl 
Összesen  3 994 358  884 145  22,1%  4 137 033  951 940  23,0%  8 131 391  1 836 085  22,6% 
Fejér  1 113 779  216 806  19,5%  1 258 459  280 911  22,3%  2 372 238  497 717  21,0% 
Gyır-Moson-
Sopron  791 834  101 639  12,8%  799 532  149 331  18,7%  1 591 366  250 970  15,8% 
Komárom-
Esztergom  376 195  40 150  10,7%  448 061  96 154  21,5%  824 256  136 305  16,5% 
Vas  460 713  73 632  16,0%  513 798  65 404  12,7%  974 511  139 037  14,3% 
Veszprém  405 661  72 899  18,0%  430 057  62 532  14,5%  835 718  135 432  16,2%  
        Continue annex 4           
Észak-
Dunántúl 
Összesen  3 148 182  505 127  16,0%  3 449 907  654 333  19,0%  6 598 089  1 159 460  17,6% 
                   
Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén  749 367  176 984  23,6%  707 792  193 738  27,4%  1 457 159  370 722  25,4% 
Heves  394 560  100 455  25,5%  363 716  107 295  29,5%  758 276  207 750  27,4% 
Nógrád  150 575  15 438  10,3%  135 979  26 921  19,8%  286 554  42 359  14,8% 
Pest  755 228  120 409  15,9%  783 354  178 591  22,8%  1 538 582  298 999  19,4% 
Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg  1 035 791  347 332  33,5%  922 740  341 655  37,0%  1 958 531  688 987  35,2% 
Észak-
Magyarország 
Összesen  3 085 521  760 618  24,7%  2 913 581  848 199  29,1%  5 999 102  1 608 817  26,8% 
Mindösszesen  16 779 333  3 896 435  23,2%  16 212 463  4 218 584  26,0%  32 991 796  8 115 019  24,6% 


























Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Agency  
 
Categories  Offerers  Total offered quantity 
1 000 Tons  Number  Total=100  Tons  Total=100 
Intervention period 2004/05 
100 >               4     0,4%           0,8     20% 
10  -100             64     6,5%           1,6     41% 
5    - 10            91     9,3%           0,6     15% 
1    - 5          320     32,6%           0,8     20% 
0,1 - 1  375  38,1%           0,1     3% 
     < 0,1  129  13,1%           0,0     0% 
Total  983  100,0%           3,9     100% 
Intervention period 2005/06 
100 >               4     0,4%          0,8     19% 
10  -100             82     8,8%          1,7     40% 
5    - 10            94     10,0%          0,7     17% 
1    - 5          344     36,7%          0,9     21% 
0,1 - 1          339     36,2%          0,1     2% 
     < 0,1            74     7,9%          0,0     0% 
Total          937     100,0%          4,2     100% 